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Security Information

Official Diary
(Acting DD/I)

Thursday, 4 December 1952
25X1A2g

1. At morning meeting raised question of deadline for [redacted] as a co-ordinated estimate. Recommended to Director that it not be rushed and that Thursday, December 18, be set for IAC consideration. He concurred, but added that he wished the present draft to go to [redacted] and the new 25X1A9a Director of the Budget for interim information. (Schoen says draft will be 25X1A9a discussed [redacted] 12 December).

25X1A5a1

25X1A9a

2. Raised question of intelligence effort on flying saucers as per [redacted] memorandum. He said, "Raise it at the IAC."

25X1A9a

3. After the meeting, Frank Wisner asked me whether or not certain highly sensitive papers dealing [redacted] matters would be of use to me on a regular basis and whether or not I wanted them in full. On the basis of my reading, I suggested that they could be sanitized and should then be made available to the appropriate desk at O/CI. We shall talk further about this.

25X1X7

J. 25X1A9a 25X1X7

4. Conferred with [redacted] and [redacted]. He is an outstanding economist and one of their best analysts and should certainly be put to more use than acting as a mere mail pouch for transmission of material. I suggested that after he was briefed on our operations and had his feet on the ground, I would welcome specific proposals from him as to participating in our research work with particular reference to our studies of the Chinese economy. He will also work closely with [redacted] on the NIS program.

25X1X7

25X1A9a

5. Attended and chaired the IAC Meeting because of pressure of business on DCI. At the opening of the meeting, procured consent to the schedule for the next two weeks - Albania and 64 Supplement, taking the Bloc estimate through June 1954 to be completed by the IAC on 11 December, and [redacted] on 18 December.

25X1A2g

a. NIE-70, Latin America, was approved with a little discussion and only one minor change suggested by State.

b. Very informally raised the question of flying saucers, the recent indications of highly specific observations that could not be satisfactorily explained. Suggested that we were considering enlisting top scientific brains and getting NSC directive so as to enable DCI to co-ordinate resources on a scope wider than the IAC agencies. Though [redacted] was very lukewarm to the substance of the idea, he was very agreeable to the procedure. General Porter, G-2, and O/NI expressed approval and the others took a benevolently neutral position. It was agreed that [redacted] would proceed to organize a scientific review group and, at the same time, would circulate for comment a proposed NSCID covering development of means to assure prompt and positive identification of these phenomena.

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25X1A9a

25X1A9a 6. After the meeting, conferred with Admiral Espe, in company with [redacted] of FI, on the latest developments in CIA's position at the [redacted] ence. Showed them the cables, explained that we had gotten ourselves in a box and realized that withdrawal at this late minute might be quite annoying to Capt. Layton, but that in view of the positive recommendations of Becker and

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6. (cont'd.)

Adm. Overesch, we at this end could not see our way clear to do other than withdraw the presence of our individual, while at the same time giving the Captain all possible intelligence substance, which is already accomplished. Adm. Espey was very cordial and agreed to advise us of any cables from Layton and planned to do his best to smooth any ruffled feathers.

FOIAb3c

7. Conferred briefly with Porter and [REDACTED] and reported to them what I had done with reference to the African explosion. They seemed perfectly happy (Note for future record: I think we should put a 90-day tickler on this and get in touch with DD/P if no reports have been received from this area at that time.)

25X1A9a

8. Complained vigorously to [REDACTED] over the reduction in cable authorization names to three in the whole DD/I area. He agreed to reconsider, and I instructed [REDACTED] to add the substantive ADs and their Execs. to the list in order to avoid unjustifiable time delays and snafus if every cable had to be brought through this office.

25X1A5a1

9. Conferred with [REDACTED] on problems arising out of the economic side of NIE-65. Gave them guidance along the lines of taking full responsibility for their best professional judgment and noting but not bowing to contradictory estimates from Military or other O/RR Divisions. The O/NI and G-2 contributions in this area are fantastically inadequate and are ideal ammunition in my struggle to have O/RR take over all economic intelligence including that on Military end items.

25X1A9a

10. Lunched with [REDACTED] and had a general discussion of problems of mutual interest, including security requirements of the operational offices and the problems arising from overseas travel by DDI personnel. It was quite clear that by constant communication and full disclosure, most every matter between the two areas can be satisfactorily solved.

25X1A9a 11. Conferred with [REDACTED] He reported that he had had a two-hour talk with the Trade and Intelligence people at State reviewing the rubber situation. He felt that there was no real residue of ill will and that, in fact, much good would probably come from the lessons learned during the preparation of the rubber paper.

25X1A9a

12. With [REDACTED], conferred with Messrs. Lay and Gleason at the NSC office with respect to summary evaluation. Agreed that the very detailed terms of reference in the nature of questions that must be answered should be prepared irrespective of the machinery for obtaining the answers. Further agreed that the machinery should consist of a high level Steering Group to be chaired by a presidential appointee and including as members, a representative of the IAC, of the JCS, and of both IIC and the ICIS. Each of these should be men of real authority and should be supported by top flight deputies for actual work. It is important that the Steering Group be constituted from the outset of the program and concern itself with the entire exercise, starting with reviewing and finalizing the terms of reference presented to the NSC. [REDACTED] will have a revised draft reflecting these and yesterday's discussions for my consideration by Saturday.

* 12 Feb - RA Jr says this identified as a large mistake & Hq Services have been informed.

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13. [REDACTED] reported that DCI had discussed at the PSB luncheon [REDACTED]

request for guidance on policy as to be followed in publishing materials. The Director stated that items (a) and (b) of my memorandum were approved, i. e., that unclassified materials should be published. As to classified studies, there was serious doubt because of the fact that CIA would have to take responsibility for the sanitizing and could not afford to expend valuable resources in this process. I undertook to discuss this matter informally with [REDACTED] with an eye to determining the amount of effort needed on our part and the extent of the problem generally.

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14. [REDACTED] also asked me to pick up the request made by Commander Spruance on the DD/P offices that CIA provide a briefing for Admiral Espey. Apparently, DCI feels that this is somewhat unnecessary but that we should at least make the offer along the lines of what was put on last March for State and the Military.

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15. [REDACTED] reported that [REDACTED] and he had satisfactorily settled the questions of [REDACTED] in a manner similar to [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] original proposal.

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17. Conferred with [REDACTED] who has recently received a form letter turning down his application for a position with O/RR. [REDACTED]

so I undertook to find out what the substance was behind this. [REDACTED] informed me that it was not a security matter but that several personality defects were reported in the course of his check which convinced Personnel that he would not be a good bet. In guarded, but fairly frank terms, gave this information to [REDACTED] which appeared to relieve him.

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